

Challenges to Sustainable Police-Building: the Development of the Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste

Bu V.E. Wilson

As the new United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) launches into the rebuilding the national police force it is important to consider lessons learned from other police-building experiences and from UNTAET's experience of creating the Timor-Leste Police Force (PNTL) in 2000. UNTAET made a number of significant mistakes, as did the Timor-Leste government, which contributed to the development of a politicized force. An important lesson from global police-building experiences is the necessity to take local context into account. However, there may also be difficulties in dealing with local agendas in highly politicized environments. In Timor-Leste there are particular issues that need to be understood. A key issue is that the centralized state has generally had little relevance to the day-to-day life of the largely rural population. Additionally, frameworks for understanding what is right and wrong differ significantly from those inherent in 'modern' legislature. External police interventions need to consider the realities of life beyond the capital and seek to understand and engage with broader security issues.

Introduction

For the second time in six years the United Nations (UN) in Timor-Leste is engaged in the process of (re)building a national police force¹. This followed the dramatic and bloody events of April and May 2006 when the leadership of the Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste (PNTL) deserted their posts, the Minister of the Interior is alleged to have distributed weapons to civilians, clashes between the Falintil - Forças Armadas de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL)² and the PNTL resulted in the deaths of a significant number of PNTL, and PNTL fractured along factional lines (UN 2006). At the request of the Timor-Leste Government an international intervention force of both police and military arrived to maintain law and order in May 2006, followed by a new UN Mission in August 2006.

The new United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)³ has a mandate that includes "the restoration and maintenance of public security", assisting the Timor-Leste Government with "the further training, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL as well as the Ministry of the Interior", and assisting the Timor-Leste Government to conduct "a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector, including the ... FDTL, the Ministry of Defence, the PNTL and the Ministry of the Interior" (UN Security Council 2006).

The crisis unfolded quickly, resulting in widespread unrest in the capital, and the internal displacement of some 150 000 people. Although the form of the crisis had

¹ On this occasion the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) is working together with the Government of Timor-Leste (RDTL). During the UNTAET period it was initially a UN responsibility that was later supported by bilateral assistance.

² F-FDTL is the Timor-Leste military, often referred to in an abbreviated form - FDTL

³ UNMIT was established by Security Council Resolution 1704 of 25 August 2006.

not been anticipated, institutional weaknesses in both the PNTL and F-FDTL and their respective Ministries had been matters of concern for some time. In these circumstances it is timely to look at the sustainability of externally assisted police development in Timor-Leste.⁴ As the process starts for a second time it is important to ask the question “Did we learn anything the last time around?”

This paper will provide a very abbreviated review of the development of the PNTL, place it in the global context of post-conflict police-building under international auspices, and examine some challenges specific to the Timor-Leste context.

Global post-conflict police-building challenges

The attempt to build a post-conflict police force in Timor-Leste occurs against a backdrop of similar processes happening in many other countries and it is useful to examine the difficulties in this process that have been observed in other situations.

However, establishing whether a police-building or reform project has actually been successful is a complex undertaking. The difficulties include the diverse and comparatively recent approaches being trialed, the long time frames one needs to assess the success of the process and lack of agreement on what exactly one is trying to attain or when it is that one has “arrived” (Bayley 2005).

Also, the success of any such process will depend as much, or probably more, on the broader nation-building “project” as well as the success or otherwise in addressing key economic and social issues and underlying political divisions. Separating out the effect of a specific police-building project and determining whether the success was due to, or even in spite of, external assistance remains a monitoring and evaluation challenge (Bayley 2005).

Other authors elaborate on lessons learned, including the need to understand the slow pace of reform that involves transforming fundamental power relations, that the exercise is more than a matter of technical input and equipment, the need to focus on institutional and management capacity as well as personnel development and the importance of creating and resourcing independent oversight mechanisms (O'Neill 2005; Rees 2006). Some analysts argue there are particular issues when building police forces in the context of ongoing peacekeeping missions; highlighting inadequate attention to demobilisation and reintegration issues, the problem with viewing development of local security forces as an endpoint rather than something to be integrated into a peacekeeping mission from the outset, the rapid transfer from foreign to indigenous public security management and lack of focus on overarching security policy, management and oversight structures (Rees 2005; Rees 2006). There are nearly always difficulties coordinating different donor's assistance with varying approaches, mandates and, not uncommonly, hostility and suspicion towards each other's efforts (Mobekk 2005).

Increasingly attention is being paid to the foreigners who are charged with carrying out the reform or the assistance. In cases where the assistance to develop or

⁴ Some matters in this paper have been updated since it was presented at the University of Melbourne Roundtable Discussion Exploring the Tensions of Nation Building in Timor Leste on 15 September 2006 to take into account the subsequent release of the Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry in October 2006.

reform a local police force is happening at the same time as a peacekeeping mission, it has been noted that both the skills-sets and the time-frames required for these two tasks can be very different. The rapid turnover of international advisers, trainers and mentors mean that important trust relationships have little chance to develop and that the advisers never gain an adequate appreciation of the local context (Call 2003; Mobekk 2005). The difficulty of getting foreigners to think beyond replicating what they know from Washington, Sydney, Lisbon or Suva remains a challenge. The lack of regular debriefing of personnel upon return from overseas means that donor organisations are not demonstrating a commitment to learning as they go (Bayley 2005). The need for better briefing, training and preparation of staff to be deployed overseas and the need to have a section of deploying organisations devoted to this matter, or to have staff dedicated to this task, has begun to be appreciated both internationally and in Australia (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000; Wainwright 2004)

However, it is still the case that the planning and implementation of these programs will be undertaken by many who lack experience either in the particular country or region or in the principles of development assistance (Dinnen 2003). It is arguable that police reform is far too important to be left to police experts, but must involve area specialists, social scientists and historians, with time allocated for collection and analysis of information about the traditions and practices of the police as well as about society more broadly (Bayley 2005). The shortage of police on the ground in donor countries is believed to mean that the most suited personnel can often not be chosen. In the case of the UN, widely differing backgrounds among the United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL) contingents has meant a lack of coherence in approaches to policing or police training (Hood 2006).

The need for police reforms to be accompanied by development of other related arms of government such as the courts, the prosecution service, the prisons as well as relevant ministries and the parliament is often stressed in a security sector approach or a whole-of-government approach (Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Mobekk 2005). The need to clearly separate the roles of the police and military to ensure stability has been stressed (Rees 2004).

Engaging with the local

Almost universally, the importance of paying attention to the local context is listed by analysts as being of paramount concern in attempts to explicate generic lessons learnt. The record of transplanting models from one context to the other has tended to be problematic. Various authors stress the importance of local ownership of the process, understanding the history of the conflict, paying attention to the balance of ethnic groups in the current or proposed police force, ensuring that structures will be economically sustainable, the need for cooperation with local leaders, or advocating a country specific approach (see e.g. Sismanidis 1997; Bayley 2005; Mobekk 2005; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2005).

However, some authors note that sections of existing government or security services may have a vested interest in not reforming or democratising their security forces, or keeping formal structures contradictory or vague (Scheye and Peake 2005; Rees 2006). Moreover, even where members of the recipient country are involved in designing the process or program they will inevitably draw on foreign models and experiences. This is problematic as relatively few successful models of policing exist

anywhere and furthermore the models with which the recipient countries are most familiar will frequently be those of a former colonising power or authoritarian regime. Often these will not be underpinned by a commitment to human rights or citizen service (Call 2003). The pitfalls and difficulties of dealing with local agendas in an often highly politicised environment that are anything but homogenous, and the accompanying danger of being “captured” by a particular faction during early attempts to understand a complex situation have been noted (Rees 2002).

Whereas all the above issues impacting on sustainability of a police-building process are drawn from global concerns, there are additional factors specific to Timor-Leste that need to be understood to ensure that “paying attention to the local” is a meaningful refrain. Timor-Leste has only recently become an independent state, following a brutal occupation that has conditioned people’s ideas of appropriate conduct for police. Despite much state-building activity at the centre, the population is predominantly rural, and still relies on enduring local authority structures. Traditional frameworks for understanding right and wrong are often at odds with the ostensibly “modern” legislative framework. Throughout all strata of society people’s local identifications remain important and are an influence on national level politics (Bennett 2002; Hohe and Nixon 2003; Kabutaulaka 2005; McLeod and Dinnen 2006).

The general lesson that inherited or transferred institutions often do not transplant well has particular relevance in societies where the centralised state, and its abstractions of legal order, in pre-independence times as well as the present, often has had little relevance to the day-to-day life of the population (Hegarty, May et al. 2004). It may be possible to create a quasi-functioning state that is able to restore law and order and serve the interests of the intervening forces, but it often does not address the underlying causes of civil unrest, nor can it build long-term peace. Almost invariably such external interventions do not engage extensively with the realities of existence outside the national capital, and can be characterised by a failure to engage with non-state or sub-national actors. Consequently the social foundations of such new institutions are markedly absent, with serious consequences for the sustainability, legitimacy and effectiveness of those organisations. (Lawrence 1969; Dinnen 2000; Dinnen 2003; Hohe 2003; Hohe and Nixon 2003; Kabutaulaka 2005; Nixon 2006).

Development of Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste

In Timor-Leste the creation of the Police Force was commenced by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in early 2000, with the first class of recruits starting in March that year (Hood 2006). An initial period of police development under the auspices of the UN was followed by a shift to a bilateral development program primarily under Australian auspices⁵ with continued input from the UN.

Although the establishment of an indigenous police force formed an explicit part of the responsibilities of the UNTAET administration the process was slow to get started, poorly planned and resourced and overwhelmingly failed to pay attention to the local context. No CIVPOL were specifically allocated to this task until mid 2000

⁵ The Australian program is known as the Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP) and is a cooperative venture between the Australian Federal Police, AusAID and an Australian Managing Contractor. Some specialized units of PNTL were being trained by the Portuguese special forces. Following the crisis of April/May 2006 the TLPDP program was suspended until further notice.

and no staff recruited for the task of training or capacity-building. A lack of consultation on the process of recruitment resulted in a decision to include 350 former officers of the Indonesian police, primarily from the western part of the country. This laid the foundations for a deeply factionalised force and severe animosity between the PNTL and the FDTL. Poor recruitment decisions for both PNTL and army that did not take account of local political realities are widely believed to have sparked the beginning of the widespread violence and subsequent fractures within the PNTL (Hood 2006).

New police recruits were given only three months of formal training,⁶ followed by field training of six months which was the responsibility of CIVPOL officers on the ground and was characterised by a lack of coherent strategy and dependent on the quality and approach of the CIVPOL in any particular district. The majority of police received no training on the laws they were expected to uphold and little training in human rights. The highly inadequate nature of recruitment and training during this period was compounded by an almost complete failure to address institution-building. By late 2002 concerns about the lack of progress with the development of the force led to a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) that was not well supported by the UN Police Commissioner, poorly resourced by CIVPOL and had almost no East Timorese involvement. The highly critical report resulted in what can only be described as half-hearted, feeble and uncoordinated responses from the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET). This eventually gave the impetus for Australia and the United Kingdom to begin to design what became the Timor-Leste Police Development Program under Australian auspices (JAM 2003; Graydon 2004; Rees 2004; Hood 2006).

Significant mistakes were made by UNTAET in establishing the PNTL. However, the Timor-Leste Government further contributed to the poor record of the PNTL through politicisation of the security forces, the failure to develop critical policy and legislation, and the rumoured creation of shadow forces. Similarly, the arbitrary and violent ways in which the security forces conducted themselves lead to a lack of confidence in centralised institutions (Amnesty International 2003; Mobekk 2003; Human Rights Watch 2006; ABC News online 2006).

Challenges in rebuilding the police force

Although the international police under UN auspices has now taken executive policing responsibility in Timor-Leste, security still remains uncertain in the capital. Significantly, the perception of lack of security is important in that it is preventing tens of thousands of people having the confidence to leave the internally displaced camps throughout Dili, and return home. There are pressing security imperatives that cannot be addressed solely by development of policing. However, in order for those police-building initiatives to be successful they will need to engage with and understand the broader security issues at stake. There is a need to understand that law and order are not synonymous with peace and security; that the former is comparatively easy and the latter quite difficult, multifaceted and, by definition, requires the engagement of a far broader range of actors than external police assistance is conventionally comfortable with (Powles 2006). The extent of violence

⁶ Former Indonesian era police were given only four weeks formal training.

and insecurity that has been witnessed in Timor-Leste requires a major and ongoing commitment to peace-building.

Coordination and political will

The coordination and respective responsibilities for police-building between the UN, any bilateral providers and the Timorese Government need to be determined early on. Arguably all of these actors previously made critical mistakes and it is hoped that those previous efforts can be evaluated before embarking on similar processes.

Culture of impunity

The failure to deal with criminal activity in the current context extends the culture of impunity in Timor-Leste. Historically, people are aware of the lack of progress in the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC)⁷ (see e.g. Judicial System Monitoring Program 2005; Cohen 2006). There has also been a pattern of failure of the security forces to regard their members as subject to the law, as well as to deal with complaints at an institutional level. More recently people are asking whether the charges brought against the former Minister of the Interior and the former Prime Minister will be progressed and why there is an apparent failure to adequately address gang violence. The importance of acting on the findings of the Special Commission of Inquiry⁸ with due attention to process and procedural fairness will be critical to addressing the malaise of impunity, and crucial to the future operation of the PNTL.

Screening and demobilisation issues

The current process of screening PNTL staff to exclude those considered unsuitable to continue in a reconstructed force needs to be carried out with due regard for procedural fairness. The way in which those who will not continue are demobilised will be critical to future stability of both the PNTL and society more broadly.

Disarmament

The international forces report considerable success in retrieving weapons that during the recent unrest dispersed into the community from the armouries of both the PNTL and the FDTL. However, the significant number of unaccounted for weapons remains a major threat to the community, is a disincentive for people to consider leaving the camps and makes the task of re-establishing security extremely difficult. The incentive for people to give up weapons is not high in a situation where trust levels are low, the future appears uncertain and there is no convincing security apparatus.

⁷ The Special Panels for Serious Crimes were established by UNTAET Regulations 2000/11 and 2000/15 with exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of persons accused of serious crimes committed between 1 January 1999 and 25 October 1999, as well as for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture without this temporal restriction. When the SPSC was adjourned in May 2005 only 100 of those indicted had been tried, had their cases withdrawn or were ruled unfit to stand trial with an additional 339 defendants beyond the reach of the jurisdiction. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1704 of 2006 that established the new United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor (UNMIT) also makes provision for "assistance to resume investigative functions of the former Serious Crimes Unit, with a view to completing investigations into outstanding cases of serious human rights violations committed in the country in 1999".

⁸ The Independent Special Commission of Inquiry was established under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights following a request from the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Timor-Leste to the Secretary General. Its mandate was to report on the facts and circumstances relevant to incidents that took place on 28-29 April and 23-25 May 2006 and related events or issues that contributed to the crisis, clarify responsibility and recommend measures of accountability (UN2006).

Dealing with the establishment legacies of FDTL and PNTL

Arguably the decisions made by UNTAET in how the police and army were recruited and managed set some very difficult footings for the two forces and contributed to the politicising of the forces. In the case of PNTL, heavy reliance on police from the former Indonesian forces, predominantly from the west of the country, inflamed relations with veterans and former combatants. The low esteem in which Indonesian police were held has not contributed to building rapport with the community and contributed to the extremely difficult relationships with FDTL (Rees 2004).

Leaving the selection of the FDTL up to the Falintil high command, without consultation with Fretilin, meant that parts of the government never entirely trusted FDTL. Subsequently, members of the government sought to build PNTL capability and firepower as a counter to the power of FDTL (Rees 2004).

The issue of determining credible leadership for the security forces is now imperative. Credible leadership will be required to anchor reconciliation initiatives between the forces, as well as to carry out the necessary reforms.

Separating the role of PNTL and FDTL

Conflict between PNTL and FDTL is further underwritten by the difficulty of defining a role for FDTL. Although the Constitution makes a clear separation between the role of the police and the military, the details of how the forces should work together has never been articulated in the form of a national security policy. It is further confused by lacunae in legislation including how military aid to a civil power should work (eg in cases where the police are unable to manage an internal security issue or in other cases of emergency such as natural disaster).

Unfortunately, early ideas about not having an army dissipated, partly as a result of the violence of 1999 and partly as a belated concern within UNTAET about what to do with the increasingly unhappy conditions of Falintil who had been kept in cantonment for up to 14 months (McCarthy 2002). However the ostensible role of an army to deal with external threats is problematic in Timor-Leste, as FDTL does not have the capacity to deal militarily with any threat from a foreign power. Additionally, decisions made early on not to deploy FDTL in a border patrol role and subsequently the creation of a special Border Patrol Unit within PNTL was not well received by FDTL as it represented the closing of one of the few possibilities for them to have a meaningful role. The difficulties associated with a force with realistically little to do, fewer resources than PNTL, less pay, poor living and working conditions and almost non-existent policy and management development, is of course not a recipe for stability.

Consideration will also need to be given as to how to include rebels and petitioners in a process of dialogue. Unless people have a place at the table they will continue to be or continue to be perceived to be a destabilising force. Similar consideration needs to be given to carrying through the processes of the three veterans commissions.⁹

⁹ Two veterans commissions were established in 2002 by President Xanana Gusmao to research and register veterans of the resistance. The *Comissão para os Assuntos dos Antigos Combatentes* (Commission for Matters of Ex-Combatants) focuses on those who fought between 1975 and 1979 and the *Comissão para os Assuntos dos Veteranos das Falintil* (Commission for Matters of Veterans of Falintil) relates to those who fought between 1979 and 1999. The *Comissão para os Assuntos dos*

Conclusion

Clearly making a success of police building is a complex matter, which in turn is dependent on many factors extrinsic to the project. However, it is only through an appreciation of these factors and ensuring that a commitment and flexibility to engage with the local context survives the transition from policy document to practice, is there a possibility of creating a secure environment. The role that PNTL will play in the creation of security is also a matter of paying attention to the local context.

References

- ABC News online, 2006. *Crisis result of Government failure: Ramos Horta*. 29 May, 2006. Available from: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200605/s1649383.htm>. Retrieved 03/08/06.
- Amnesty International, 2003. *The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste: A new police service - a new beginning*. Amnesty International: 96pp.
- Bayley, D.H., 2005. Police Reform as Foreign Policy. *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 38(2): 206-215.
- Bennett, J., 2002. Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands Though Much is Taken, Much Abides: Legacies of Tradition and Colonialism. *State Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper*. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies. Canberra: ANU: 16pp.
- Call, C.T., 2003. *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*. IPA Policy Report. International Peace Academy: 17 pp.
- Cawthra, G. & Luckham, R., 2003. Democratic control and the Security Sector. In G. Cawthra & R. Luckham (eds). *Governing insecurity: democratic control of military and security establishments in transitional democracies*. London: Zed Books: 305-327.
- Cohen, D., 2006. 'Justice on the Cheap' Revisited: The Failure of the Serious Crimes Process in East Timor. Analysis from the East-West Center: 12pp.
- Dinnen, S., 2000. Violence and governance in Melanesia - an introduction. In S. Dinnen & A. Ley (eds). *Reflections on violence in Melanesia*. Leichardt, NSW: The Federation Press: 1- 16.
- , 2003. Lending a Fist? Australia's new interventionism in the Southwest Pacific. *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper 2004/5*. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Canberra: ANU: 9 pp.
- Graydon, C., 2004. *Program Design Report for the Human Rights Law and Justice Program*. Caritas Australia.
- Hegarty, D., May, R., Regan, A., Dinnen, S., Nelson, H., Duncan, R., 2004. Rebuilding State and Nation in Solomon Islands: Policy Options for the Regional Assistance Mission. *State Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion paper no.2004/2*. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Canberra: ANU: 17pp.
- Hohe, T., 2003. Justice without judiciary in East Timor. *Conflict, Security and Development*, 3(3): 335-357.
- Hohe, T. & Nixon, R., 2003. *Reconciling Justice: Traditional Law and State Judiciary in East Timor* (draft). United States Institute of Peace.

Qadros da Resistência (Commission on Cadres of the Resistance) was established in August 2004 to register civilian cadres of the resistance and *clandestinos*.

- Hood, L., 2006. Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999-2004. *International Peacekeeping*, 13(1): 60-77.
- Human Rights Watch, 2006. *Tortured Beginnings: Police Violence and the Beginnings of Impunity in East Timor*. New York: 60pp.
- JAM – see Joint Assessment Mission.
- Joint Assessment Mission, 2003. *Report of the Joint Assessment Mission* carried out by The Government of Timor-Leste, UNMISSET, UNDP and Development Partner Countries for the Timor-Leste Police Service.
- Judicial System Monitoring Program, 2005. The Special Panel for Serious Crimes Hear Their Final Case. *Justice Update* 12/2005.
- Kabutaulaka, T., 2005. Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in the Solomon Islands. *The Contemporary Pacific*, 17(2): 283-308.
- Lawrence, P., 1969. The State Versus Stateless Societies in Papua and New Guinea. In B.J. Brown (ed). *Fashion of law in New Guinea: Being an account of the past, present and developing system of laws in Papua and New Guinea*. Sydney: Butterworths: 15-37.
- McCarthy, J., 2002. *Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program Final Evaluation Report*. International Organization for Migration. Dili: East Timor: 168.
- McLeod, A. & Dinnen, S., 2006. *Police Building in the Southwest Pacific - New Directions in Australian Regional Policing* (draft), Forthcoming.
- Mobekk, E., 2003. Law Enforcement: Creating and Maintaining a Police Service in a Post-conflict society - problems and pitfalls. *Working Paper*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 32pp.
- 2005. Identifying Lessons in United Nations International Policing Missions. *Policy Paper*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: 29pp.
- Nixon, R., 2006. The Crisis of Governance in New Subsistence States. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 36(1): 75-101.
- O'Neill, W.G., 2005. *Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What we know and what we still need to know*. New York: International Police Academy.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005. *Security System Reform and Governance*. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: 144pp.
- Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. Available: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/. Retrieved 01/08/06.
- Powles, A., 2006. Mission Creep: Statebuilding from Honiara to Dili. *Security Challenges*, 2(2): 9-14.
- Rees, E., 2002. Security-sector reform and transitional administrations. *Conflict, security and development*, 2(1): 151-156.
- 2004. *Under pressure Falintil Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste Three Decades of Defence Force Development in Timor-Leste 1975-2004*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: 69pp.
- 2005. Public Security Management and Peace Operations. Kosovo and UNMIK: Never Land. In A.H. Ebnöther & P.H. Fluri, (eds). *After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Ownership*. Austrian Ministry of Defence & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: 199-231.
- 2006. Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: "Improvisation and Confusion" from the Field. *Peacekeeping Best Practices*. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations: 28pp.
- Scheye, E. & Peake, G., 2005. Unknotting local ownership. In H. Ebnöther & P. Fluri (eds). *After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Ownership*. Austrian Ministry of Defence & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: 235-260.

Sismanidis, R.D.V., 1997. *Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report from a workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace. Peaceworks*. United States Institute of Peace.

UN – see United Nations.

United Nations, 2006. *Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry*. United Nations. Geneva.

United Nations Security Council, 2006. *Resolution 1704 S/RES/1704(2006)*, 25 August 2006.

Wainwright, E., 2004. *Police join the front line: Building Australia's International Policing Capability*. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.